As far as lawyers are concerned, perhaps the reason is that they are in some way forced to speak on the basis of their professional knowledge and therefore in terms of contemporary systems of law. Political scientists, on the other hand, often appear to be inclined to think of politics as a sort of technique, comparable, say, to engineering, which involves the idea that people should be dealt with by political scientists approximately in the same way as machines or factories are dealt with by engineers.
As mentioned, the ancient Greeks did not neatly distinguish grammar from logic, but rather we might say the latter was a special case of the former, as applicable to dialectical argument.
We will rectify this confusion in our own discussion, and construct a clearer account of the basic principles of classical logic. At the same time, we will also attempt to develop a better understanding of the relationship of language to logical analysis, and show how language is often informed by our philosophical intuitions, rather than the other way around.
The use of Greek and Latin in classical philosophy is less a cultural accident to be lamented than a fortuitous development, for these languages more clearly and precisely express true philosophical intuitions, and lend themselves more readily to the construction of a logical language.
We will also address the question of whether modern philosophy draws too sharp a distinction between logic and grammar, so that we might regard logic as a genuinely A description of subverting language which removes the logic in words phenomenon after all, which is not necessarily a liability.
Logical Functions of Linguistic Elements 1.
Language, Thought and Reality For Aristotle, language is primarily the spoken word, and only secondarily the written word. Thus it would seem that speech is the more natural, immediate expression of human thought. Even when we are experienced writers, we still articulate the words phonetically in our minds which is why homonymous typographical errors are common.
I would contend that surrogate languages for the disabled, such as sign language and braille, are more similar to written language than spoken language, as they are learned only with great effort, and are in many aspects derivative of phonetic language.
Sign language, once learned, however, can become a mode of expression as familiar and direct as spoken language, though the partially deaf tend to think phonetically. Although it is by no means a metaphysical necessity that spoken language should be primary, this seems to be a genuine feature of human nature.
We do not need to develop a full psychological theory of meaning in order to explore the relationship between language and logic, but we do need to clarify how language expresses thought, since logic is concerned primarily with concepts the objects of thoughtand only incidentally with language, as a means to an end.
The relationship of language to logic concerns us because we wish to know whether and how language can relate truth, which is properly the domain of logic. For most of history, in fact, philosophers have spoken of linguistic propositions as being true or false, without making a clear distinction between the grammatical and the logical.
If it is uttered now, it would correspond to an affirmation that is false, but if the same sentence were uttered years ago, it would correspond to a distinct affirmation that happened to be true. In modern philosophy, statements are not grammatical objects at all, but concepts that can be represented by sentences, if only equivocally.
To clearly distinguish between the linguistic and the logical, I will use single quotation marks to signify a linguistic expression and double quotation marks to signify the logical concept behind an expression. Notwithstanding this subtle distinction, it would be rash to divorce truth and falsity altogether from linguistic objects.
The facts of common experience clearly demonstrate our practical ability to relate truths and generate knowledge through language, so our sentences must correspond to logical objects in some way, and, provided the appropriate context such as who is speaking, how the speaker uses words, and when he is speaking they can convey logical meaning unequivocally, enabling understanding on the part of the hearer.
Grammatical propositions, when understood according to the sense of the speaker, can relate truth and falsity, even if we still hesitate to ascribe truth and falsity directly to the grammatical expression. The dialogue focuses on a basic linguistic object, the name, and explores whether names are merely conventional or reflect the nature of the thing they name.
While it seems axiomatic that we can affix any arbitrary phonetic label to any object, Plato makes a compelling case that in fact some names are better than others, suggesting there is an aspect of naming that comes from nature, not convention.
Plato deduces from the truth or falsity of propositions that individual words can also be true or false. Like other ancient thinkers, he understands a proposition to be a linguistic object, a sentence conveying an affirmation or denial.
He presupposes a context in which the sentence can be understood univocally, so that it is effectively what we call a statement. A true linguistic proposition univocally interpreted relates that which is, while a false linguistic proposition relates that which is not.
If a linguistic proposition as a whole is true, it corresponds to that which is, so its grammatical components must correspond to things that are, insofar as these components correspond to logical components of the logical proposition i.
Thus Plato infers that words can be true or false, depending on whether or not they correspond to some reality. This notion of truth and falsitysometimes called ontological truth, deals with simple declarations of existence, as contrasted with the familiar Aristotelian and modern notion of logical truth, which evaluates only composite expressions or judgments.
A principal difficulty in constructing a logical analysis of language is determining which words correspond to logical components of a statement. Some languages incorporate prepositions by inflection of nouns, while others have these as separate words.
Plato is concerned only with those words that correspond to entities, which we have discussed elsewhere as being universal or particular substances or accidents corresponding roughly to the modern categories of property, kind, object and trope. These entities can be described by individual nouns, verbs, adjectives or adverbs, or by prepositional phrases and other composite expressions.
In CratylusPlato restricts his discussion to names, which may be taken as substantives or nouns, though much of his discussion can be applied more broadly. He regards a name as the smallest part of a proposition, representing an entity that is the object of logical analysis.
A name in this sense need not be confined to substantives, but may include verbs, adjectives, adverbs, and the various predicate expressions used to denote accidents. The basic question with which Cratylus is concerned is whether the linguistic objects we choose to represent ontological entities are a matter of mere convention, or are constrained by the nature of the entity described.
The initial reaction of most modern readers of Plato would be similar to that of Aristotle, who regarded words as completely arbitrary conventions, a set of sounds or scripts that can be chosen as whimsically as we please, so long as we agree by common consent that they should be ascribed a certain meaning.
This is an ironic claim by a master of poetry, where the sound and form of words are essential to the relation of meaning. Regarding the relationship between reality and language, most realists are no different from Protagoras in declaring man to be the measure of things.
Plato tries to bring us to an understanding of how language is to some extent natural, and not merely conventional, beginning with a refutation of the sophistical relativism we rightly reject in many others aspects of philosophy. A softer interpretation would be that only phenomena are knowable, while things-in-themselves are unknowable.
An even milder interpretation would be that things-in-themselves, though knowable, are not expressible in human language.Foreword to the Third Edition.
B runo Leoni was a devoted proponent, in virtually all his activities, of those ideals we call liberal. He was a remarkable talented, intelligent, able, persuasive, multifaceted individual who might well have deserved the description. Against the Theory of ‘Dynamic Equivalence’ by Michael Marlowe Revised and expanded, January Introduction.
Among Bible scholars there is a school which is always inquiring into the genres or rhetorical forms of speech represented in any given passage of the Bible, and also the social settings which are supposed to be connected with these forms. Angelology: the Study of Angels: Part 2A of Bible Basics: Essential Doctrines of the Bible.
Includes The Purpose, Creation and Nature of Angels, Satan's Rebellion and World Rule, The Occasion of the devil's Rebellion and fall from grace, God's Judgment on the Universe, God's Restoration of the Earth, God's Replacement for Satan, Satan and the Fall of Man, The Limits of Satan's World Rule.
Formulas are strings of symbols.
In sentential logic, the symbols include all the upper case letters, the five connective symbols, as well as left and right parentheses. Certain strings of symbols count as formulas of sentential logic, and others do not, as determined by the following definition.
The Lifecycle of a Revolution. In the early days of the public internet, we believed that we were helping build something totally new, a world that would leave behind the shackles of age, of race, of gender, of class, even of law.
PSYC Final study guide by laurendyess includes questions covering vocabulary, terms and more. An investigator covers a toy and watches whether a child removes the cover to retrieve the toy.
Which concept is the investigator apparently testing? The underlying logic of language .